“God, having made man such a creature that, in His own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, placed him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and natural inclination to draw him into society. Moreover, He endowed him with reason and language, enabling him to maintain and enjoy that society.” (Second Treatise, p. 230)
Men are born free. They possess the rights and privileges granted by the law of nature. In this, they are equal to every other man. Each individual holds the power to preserve his property — that is, his life, liberty, and estate — against the injuries and encroachments of others. He also holds the authority to judge and punish violations of that law. Yet, such private judgment inevitably leads to inconvenience and disorder.
Thus, when individuals renounce their private judgment, they entrust the power to adjudicate and punish to a collective authority. By doing so, they unite into one body. This union establishes a common, recognized law. It also creates an impartial judiciary to which all may appeal. This authority holds the power to resolve disputes and punish offenders. True political and civil society forms only when the public receives the executive power—the power to judge and punish.
This shows that absolute monarchy fundamentally conflicts with civil society. It cannot serve as a legitimate form of civil government. Where the monarch holds all power—both legislative and executive—in his own person, no impartial judge remains. No avenue of appeal is open to individuals.
One might object that subjects under an absolute monarchy still appeal to “the law.” But does this truly reflect love for mankind and society? Does it fulfill the moral duty of charity we owe one another? That is highly questionable. Such legal restraint often amounts to little more than self-interest. A ruler may keep his subjects from harming or destroying one another. But he does so not out of genuine concern for their well-being. He does it to protect his own power, profit, or status. Their preservation benefits him.
Of the Beginning of Political Societies
“Men, being by Nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent; which is done by agreement with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living.” (2, p. 240)
Thus, they form a community—a single body—with the power to act collectively, guided by the will of the majority. This body arises from the consent of individuals. By agreeing to unite with others, each person places himself under an obligation to every other member of society to accept the majority’s decisions.
Historical records show that, in many cases, governments concentrated power in the hands of one person. But this does not contradict Locke’s claim. Political society begins with the consent of individuals to join together. Why were monarchies so common? Not merely because of respect for parental authority. In fact, many early monarchies, especially near their origin, were often elective rather than strictly hereditary.
Locke’s theory of political power follows five key steps. First, he defines political power. Second, he explains its origin. Third, he establishes the rule of right. Fourth, he shows how people conditionally entrust power to government through consent. Finally, he describes how government exercises and limits that power through law—and how revolution remains possible when those limits are breached.
Locke’s answer is that political power is a natural attribute of individuals. This premise of political individualism leads to several conclusions. People are naturally self-governing because they can exercise political power themselves. They are naturally free because no one is born subject to another’s will. They are naturally equal because all possess the duty and the right to exercise political power. This premise of political individualism represents one of the significant conceptual innovations in early modern political thought. (4, p. 620)
The first move Locke makes is, as we have seen, to locate political power within individuals themselves. Earlier natural freedom theorists accepted that individuals naturally possess the right to defend themselves and their property from attack. They even recognised the right to kill an attacker if necessary. However, traditional accounts did not frame this right of defence as full political power. Even the most influential absolutist theories of the seventeenth century—those of Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, and Samuel Pufendorf—emerged from this natural freedom tradition. These theories claimed that people completely alienate their natural freedom to the sovereign. Yet, they typically allowed one exception: in extreme circumstances, the people may withdraw their consent and defend themselves against a murderous tyrant. But again, people generally did not frame this right of defence as political power in its broader, positive form.
Thus, before Locke, the tradition of natural freedom treated political power in a holistic, hierarchical manner. Although theorists recognized people as naturally free, they understood this natural freedom as non-political, since politically, individuals were subject to the community, and the community to its representative governing bodies. Few, if any, theorists were willing to grant individuals or the people collectively the inherent capacity to exercise political power themselves. In positing political individualism or individual popular sovereignty, Locke therefore breaks with over five centuries of elite political holism and reconceptualises the origins of political power in a radically populist way. (4, p. 622)
Locke extends the traditional justifications of defence to a generalised right of proceeding against those who violate natural law. Since tyranny and usurpation now define any violation of natural law — as using power beyond right and using power without right, respectively — he significantly broadens the foundation for justified revolt.
The Practice of Trust
In the Two Treatises, Locke adopts the ‘trust theory’ of the relationship between government and governors. First, interpretations often labelled the ‘alienation hypothesis’ consider the sovereign outside political society because he does not obey its laws, making absolutism incompatible with true political society.Locke’s second reason for rejecting the alienation theory is that governments, over time, tend toward tyranny. As states develop, rulers accumulate wealth and power and tend to cultivate interests distinct from, and often opposed to, those of the people. The third, and perhaps most decisive, reason for this change is Locke’s belief that, as a matter of historical fact — particularly after the Reformation and the English Civil War — individuals do not alienate their natural political power. (4, p. 631)
Revolution
When rulers abuse their power, the people must govern their governors. Locke presents this as a response to the crisis of government in the early modern period. The people entrust their political power to their governors with the expectation that it will be exercised faithfully. In practice, when the executive is separate from the legislative, the legislative holds superior authority. It controls the executive and may change or replace it when necessary. The people must judge whether their governors have betrayed the trust placed in them. If so, they must act. They may execute this judgement through revolution and the establishment of a new government. If the legislative fails or abuses its trust, power returns to the people.Revolution then becomes an exercise of their regained natural political power to judge and execute according to natural law. (4, p. 637)
Who has the right to execute this judgement by taking up arms against the government? Locke’s answer is that each individual holds this right. Ultimately, the people themselves possess full constituent authority to re-establish the previous form of government, to create a new one, or to institute direct democracy — “to continue the legislative in themselves.” (4, p. 637)
Hobbes had argued in Leviathan that civil war arises when individuals claim the right to judge the law according to their subjective standard of conscience, or “private judgement.” Grotius and Filmer similarly placed the supposed “anarchy” of individual judgements at the centre of their critique of the natural freedom tradition.
Bibliography
- Two Treatises of Government, with introduction and critical apparatus, ed. Peter Laslett, Cambridge, 2003.
- Two Treatises on Civil Government, London: Routledge, 1887.
- John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke, Cambridge, 1995.
- The Cambridge History of Political Thought 1450–1700, ed. J.H. Burns, Cambridge, 2008.
Image
Title:
The Signing of the National Covenant in Greyfriars Kirkyard
Artist: Sir William Allan
Year: 1838
Location: City Art Centre, Edinburgh
Description: This painting depicts the Scottish nobility and clergy signing the National Covenant in 1638, a pivotal moment in Scottish history where they defied King Charles I’s religious reforms.
Usage Rights: This image is in the public domain, free for use with appropriate attribution.
Source:
Wikipedia – The Signing of the National Covenant in Greyfriars Kirkyard
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